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1CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Abstract
Reports on differences between remembering the past and imagining the future have led 
to the hypothesis that constructing future events is a more cognitively demanding process. 
However, factors that influence these increased demands, such as whether the event has been 
previously constructed and the types of details comprising the event, have remained relatively 
unexplored. Across two experiments, we examined how these factors influence the process of 
constructing event representations by having participants repeatedly construct events and 
measuring how construction times and a range of phenomenological ratings changed across time
points. In Experiment 1, we contrasted the construction of past and future events and found that, 
relative to past events, the constructive demands associated with future events are particularly 
heightened when these events are imagined for the first time. Across repeated simulations, future
events became increasingly similar to past events in terms of construction times and incorporated 
detail. In Experiment 2, participants imagined future events involving two memory details
(person, location) and then reimagined the event either i) exactly the same, ii) with a different
person, or iii) in a different location. We predicted that if generating spatial information is
particularly important for event construction, a change in location will have the greatest impact
on constructive demands. Results showed that spatial context contributed to these heightened 
constructive demands more so than person details, consistent with theories highlighting the
central role of spatial processing in episodic simulation. We discuss the findings from both 
studies in the light of relational processing demands and consider implications for current
theoretical frameworks.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, future thinking, scene construction, Bayesian 
modelling
                      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
2CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Episodic simulation refers to constructing a mental representation of a specific
autobiographical event, including future-oriented episodes (Szpunar, Spreng, et al., 2014). In the
past decade, research on episodic simulation has produced compelling evidence that this process
is intimately related to episodic memory (for reviews see Schacter et al., 2012, 2017). Numerous
studies have identified processes and properties that affect memories of the past and simulations
of the future in very similar ways. For example, early neuropsychological studies described 
patients whose brain damage led to problems not just with episodic memory, but also with 
envisioning the future (e.g., Hassabis et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2005;
Tulving, 1985). Furthermore, the brain networks underlying episodic memory and episodic
simulation largely overlap (Addis et al., 2007), and qualitative changes in remembering past
events during healthy ageing, such as decreases in episodic details contained in remembered past
events, are similarly apparent in episodic simulations (for a review see Schacter et al., 2013).
This close link between episodic memory and episodic simulation is captured 
theoretically by the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Addis, 2018; Roberts, Schacter, 
et al., 2017; Schacter & Addis, 2007), which proposes that when thinking about the future, 
details from episodic memory are extracted, recombined, and integrated into coherent events, 
thus allowing us to construct and simulate scenarios that have never occurred previously. 
According to the hypothesis, both episodic memory and episodic simulation are constructive
processes, drawing on the same information (details from episodic memory) and the same
underlying processes (construction and elaboration of the events), but episodic simulation 
additionally requires the flexible integration of episodic details into new, coherent
representations.
This notion is consistent with recent findings of phenomenological, cognitive, and neural
differences between episodic memory and episodic simulation. Studies have shown, for example, 
that imagined future events are less detailed (Addis et al., 2008; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010;
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Gamboz et al., 2010; Grysman et al., 2013;
McDonough & Gallo, 2010), less coherent (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Grysman et
al., 2013), less specific (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009), and more difficult to generate
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; McDonough & Gallo, 2010) than remembered past
events. Evidence for future events taking longer to construct than past events in laboratory 
settings is quite sparse, however, with most papers finding no evidence for a difference in 
                      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
3CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
response times (Addis et al., 2011, 2009, 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Weiler et al., 2010b, 2011), although Anderson, 
Dewhurst, and Nash (2012) have shown an effect for highly imageable cues.
The evidence reviewed above suggests that episodic simulation is associated with 
additional cognitive demands likely related to constructing an event representation for the first
time—as is the case with novel future events, which participants are typically instructed to 
construct from scratch in these experiments. For instance, a greater number of new associations
between details are formed when constructing a novel representation (e.g., simulating a future
event) relative to retrieving an existing representation (e.g., recalling a past event; Addis, 2018). 
As such, these constructive demands should decrease when an existing representation of a future
event is reimagined. Preliminary evidence for this idea comes from two studies that manipulated 
the novelty of episodic simulations using repetition paradigms (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013; van 
Mulukom et al., 2013). These studies showed that repeatedly imagining future events results in 
faster and increased ease of event construction, increased plausibility and levels of imagined 
detail, and reduced hippocampal activation, compared with the initial construction. However, 
both studies only examined the construction of future events. Previous evidence suggests that
past events also become more vivid with increasing repetition (Svoboda & Levine, 2009) and are
recalled faster when primed (Park & Donaldson, 2016); however, repeated future simulation has
not been contrasted with the repeated recall of past events in the same experiment. Doing so 
would allow examination of whether the construction of episodic simulations is more demanding 
than retrieving memories per se, or whether constructive demands during simulations are
particularly heightened when imagining a future event from scratch. Therefore, in Experiment 1, 
we adapted the repetition paradigm from van Mulukom et al. (2013) to include a condition in 
which memories of past events were recalled repeatedly, enabling us to compare directly the
effects of repetition on construction times and levels of detail comprising past versus future
events. 
The second aim of this study was to establish the role different event components (i.e., 
episodic details types) play in the constructive process, with a particular focus on distinguishing 
between the relative contribution of spatial and non-spatial details. Although some argue that
spatial context plays a central role in episodic simulations, providing the stage within which an 
imagined event unfolds (e.g., scene construction theory: Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; spatial
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
4CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
scaffold effect: Robin, 2018), others contend that the construction of spatial contexts arises out of 
a general relational processing mechanism that is also responsible for the integration of other 
event details into the event representation (e.g., constructive episodic simulation hypothesis;
Roberts, Schacter, et al., 2017). 
Some progress has been made towards disentangling the differential effects of spatial and 
non-spatial details on various aspects of episodic simulation. Two lines of evidence suggest that
spatial context may play a more central role than other event components. First, characteristics of 
the spatial context influence the quality of imagined future events, such that a more familiar 
spatial context is associated with higher levels of overall detail and clarity (Arnold et al., 2011;
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012; de Vito et al., 2012; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014, 2017;
Szpunar & McDermott, 2008), and that simulations with a clearer spatial context are perceived 
as being more likely to occur in the future (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017). Second, spatial
context has been found to serve as a superior memory cue for imagined future events (Robin et
al., 2016). However, similar effects have also been reported for non-spatial details. It has been 
shown, for example, that the familiarity of non-spatial details, such as people (D’Argembeau &
Van der Linden, 2012; McLelland et al., 2015; Robin et al., 2016) and objects (D’Argembeau &
Van der Linden, 2012) influence phenomenological aspects of episodic simulations, that person 
details result in more specific episodic simulations relative to when spatial contexts are used as
cues to elicit imagined events (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011), and that there is no difference
between person details and the spatial context of episodic simulations in terms of how well they 
are later remembered (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2017).
Taken together, the evidence does not seem stronger one way or the other with regards to 
whether spatial context plays a more central role in episodic simulation than other episodic
details. However, if spatial context does indeed provide the “stage” for a simulated event, then 
the centrality of its contribution may be limited to the initial construction rather than the later 
elaboration of the simulated events. Indeed, Robin et al. (2016) observed that participants often 
spontaneously added spatial context at the beginning of the simulation process when the initial
cue was something other than a location, while this spontaneous integration rarely occurred for 
other detail types (for a similar effect in episodic memory, see Hebscher et al., 2017). In 
Experiment 2, we aimed to clarify these findings by directly manipulating the influence of spatial
and non-spatial details (locations and people) on the construction of episodic simulations. Like in 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
5CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Experiment 1, participants repeatedly imagined future events involving key memory details. 
However, in this experiment, the future events to be reimagined were either exactly the same (no 
change), or featured a different person (person change), or were in a different location (location 
change). This allowed us to assess how a change in one component of the simulation affects its
construction and the generated detail relative to when future events are reimagined without any 
changes, and critically, whether any effects are the same or different for spatial and non-spatial
details.
The evidence reviewed above indicates that, theoretically, there are two equally plausible
models (spatial and non-spatial detail changes disrupt repetition effects equally relative to the
baseline condition vs. spatial context disrupts repetition effects more than non-spatial details
relative to the baseline condition) that should be compared to the null hypothesis (no difference
between any conditions). Therefore, we chose to use a Bayesian approach, which, unlike null
hypothesis significance testing, enables a comparison of the evidence for alternative hypotheses
against each other (rather than simply against the null), and additionally offers great flexibility in 
specifying and testing theoretically precise and constrained hypotheses (Etz et al., 2018; Fidler et
al., 2018).
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the construction of episodic
simulations is more demanding than retrieving episodic memories per se, or whether episodic
simulation is particularly demanding when imagining a novel event representation from scratch. 
To this end, we used a paradigm requiring participants to repeatedly recall past events and 
repeatedly imagine future events, while recording construction times (approximated by response
times) and subjective ratings of how much detail was incorporated into the events. We predicted 
that the initial construction of future events (i.e., time point 1) would take longer than for past
events, but that future event representations would nevertheless be less detailed. We also 
predicted that repetition effects would be evident for both past and future events, such that
construction times would decrease, and detail ratings would increase, with repeated 
retrieval/simulation (i.e., across time points 1 to 3). Critically, if episodic simulation is always
more demanding than episodic retrieval, any past-future differences evident during the initial
time point should be maintained across repeated recall/simulation. However, if simulating an 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
6CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
event from scratch is differentially more demanding, then the past-future differences should 
dissipate with repetition as future events become increasingly similar to past events with faster 
construction times and higher levels of incorporated detail.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-three healthy young adults participated in this study and provided informed 
consent in a manner approved by The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics
Committee. All participants were fluent in English, had no history of neurological or psychiatric
conditions or use of psychotropic medications, and had not participated previously in a study on 
episodic simulation. Three participants were excluded due to insufficient responses to future
event simulations (< 75% of trials). Thus, data from 20 participants (10 males, aged 18–24 years, 
M = 19.6 years old) were analysed.
Stimulus collection
The experiment consisted of two sessions (see Figure 1). During session 1 (stimulus
collection), participants recalled 100 episodic memories; for each event, they provided a short
description, the year of occurrence (later transformed into temporal distance in years from the
present), identified a person, location, and object featuring in the event, and rated each memory 
detail for familiarity on a 4-point scale (1 = unfamiliar; 4 = very familiar). Participants were
instructed that the memories had to be of specific events that occurred in the past 10 years
(verified based on descriptions and dates provided), and the three details could not be duplicated 
across events (i.e., each particular detail could only be provided once across all 100 memories). 
Of the events meeting these criteria, we randomly selected 80 to create future event cues for 
session 2 (experiment). Specifically, memory details were randomly sorted into person-location-
object sets, where each of the three memory details came from different memories; cues for past
event trials comprised the three details provided for a given memory. Note that the familiarity of 
detail sets (average across the three details) was slightly higher for the future (M = 2.84, SD = 
0.34) than for the past condition (M = 2.72, SD = 0.34; BF10 = 32.05).
                      
 
 
  
       
              
        
           
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
               
      
      
7CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Figure 1. Stimulus collection: Person, location, and object details featuring in memories were identified by
participants. Cue creation: Three details comprising a given memory (orange), or three details recombined across
multiple memories (teal) were used for the past and future conditions, respectively. Recall/simulation phase:
Participants recalled past events and imagined future events and rated how detailed and plausible the events were.
Future and past trials were presented at three time points within the same 60-trial block.
Procedure
Session 2 took place one to two weeks later (M = 11 days, SD = 6.8 days), during which 
participants completed the experiment. We used a version of the episodic recombination 
paradigm (Addis et al., 2009; see cognitiveatlas.org/task/id/trm_59ed1f7a0ac9c for a basic
description), in which participants imagine future events comprising familiar components
(locations, people, or objects). Participants saw a screen with an instruction (“recall past” or 
“imagine future”), as well as a person-location-object detail set. The task was to recall the past
event specified by the presented detail set or to imagine a novel future event comprising all three
details that might occur in a specific spatiotemporal context within the next five years. 
Participants indicated when they had constructed the event (i.e., when they had an event in mind) 
by pressing a button and then continued elaborating on the recalled or imagined event until the
end of the 8 second trial. After each trial, detail (1 = not detailed; 4 = very detailed) and 
plausibility (1 = implausible, 4 = very plausible) ratings were made (4 seconds each)1. Rating 
1 Although past events are highly plausible, having actually occurred, we nevertheless had participants rate
plausibility (i.e., how plausible each past event would have seemed a week before it happened) to equate task 
demands across the past and future conditions (van Mulukom, 2013). However, whether the interpretation of past 
                      
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
8CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
scales were followed by a fixation cross that was presented for a variable duration, ranging from
2 to 4 seconds. Critical for this experiment, every past and future detail set was repeated twice
(time point 2, time point 3) after the first presentation (time point 1), that is, participants
generated each event three times in total. During time points 2 and 3, participants were asked to 
recall/imagine the event from time point 1 without radically changing the event (such as
progressing the event in time). These repeated presentations were identical in set-up to time point
1 (cue followed by detail rating), except that plausibility ratings were not presented again. The
experiment consisted of 40 detail sets per condition; each detail set was presented three times, 
resulting in a total of 120 time points (i.e., a trial comprising recall/simulation and rating scales) 
per condition. The experiment was divided into 4 blocks of 60 time points, which were presented 
in a pseudo-random order. The distance between corresponding time points was 1–4 trials (12– 
60 seconds, plus 2–4 seconds for fixation). The experiment was performed using Presentation®
software (Version 15.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com). 
Immediately after the experiment, participants were interviewed about the events they 
had remembered and imagined. Participants gave a short description of every event and rated 
their consistency across the three time points (4-point scale; 1 = different; 4 = identical), as well
as the personal significance of the event (4-point scale; 1 = not significant; 4 = very significant). 
For future events, participants additionally estimated the temporal distance from the present (in 
years) and rated the similarity of the event relative to previous experiences (4-point scale; 1 = 
novel; 4 identical). 
Analyses
For each participant, we calculated median response time and mean detail rating across
all trials. All three time points for a given detail set were excluded from analysis if (i) no 
response was made during at least one of the time points, (ii) response times were too fast for the
participant to read the instructions on the screen (< 500ms; based on previous experiments using 
the same paradigm), or (iii) a rating of ‘1’ for consistency was given, indicating that participants
generated distinct events across time points (see Results section for the proportion of trials
excluded for each condition).
and future plausibility is the same is somewhat questionable, and thus past event plausibility ratings are not
discussed any further.
                      
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
   
 
     
  
 
  
                  
 
        
        
       
9CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
We analysed our data using Bayesian order-restricted repeated-measures ANOVAs and 
Bayesian directional paired-samples t-tests. For the ANOVAs, we used the priors defined in 
Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province (2012). For the t-tests, we used a noninformative
Jeffreys prior for the variance and a Cauchy prior with a width of √" for the standardised effect" 
size. For hypothesis testing, we used the Bayes factor (BF) as the statistical index, which is the
ratio of the probability of the data under one model (e.g., an alternative hypothesis) relative to 
the probability of the data under a competing model (often, but not necessarily, the null
hypothesis). The BF hence directly compares how well competing statistical models predict the
data (Wagenmakers et al., 2018). The subscript of the BF denotes which models are being 
compared (e.g., ‘BF10’ means the alternative hypothesis (‘1’) is being compared to the null
hypothesis (‘0’), ‘BF+0’ means the one-sided alternative hypothesis that the effect size is positive
(‘+’) is being compared to the null hypothesis), and the value of the BF can be interpreted as how
much more plausible one model is relative to the competing one (e.g., ‘BF10 = 3’ means the
alternative is 3 times more probable than the null hypothesis), while ‘BF10 = 1’ means the
alternative and the null hypothesis are equally probable. All statistical analyses were performed 
in R (RRID:SCR_001905; R Core Team, 2019), using the following packages: dplyr (Wickham
et al., 2018), tidyr (Wickham & Henry, 2018), reshape2 (Wickham, 2007), data.table (Dowle &
Srinivasan, 2018), BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2018), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009), and 
cowplot (Wilke, 2017). Data and scripts to reproduce all analyses and figures are publicly 
available at osf.io/xqm5n (Wiebels et al., 2019).
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for past and future events across all three time points are presented 
in Table 1. Response times and detail ratings for each event type are also presented in Figure 2. 
The analysed data included 95.3% of all detail sets (future:M = 93.0%, SD = 6.05; past: M = 
98.1%, SD = 2.63).
Table 1
Means (standard deviations) of response times and detail ratings from the past and future conditions at three time
points.
Response time (ms) Detail rating
Time point Past Future Past Future
1 3012.76 (850.86) 4396.71 (1012.97) 3.27 (0.44) 2.64 (0.33)
                      
 
       
       
        
 
 
 
 
 
  
             
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
      
         
                  
    
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
  
  
 
CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS 10
2 1773.46 (804.76) 2245.71 (958.36) 3.41 (0.38) 2.95 (0.42)
3 1656.68 (743.60) 1823.17 (788.09) 3.49 (0.41) 3.15 (0.49)
Note: Detail ratings made using a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (low) to 4 (high).
All other ratings data are presented in Table 2. Importantly, there was no evidence that
consistency of the events across time points differed between conditions (BF10 = 0.64). 
Moreover, the similarity of future events to previous experiences and thoughts was low, 
indicating that participants imagined novel future events, as instructed.
Table 2
Means (standard deviations) of additional ratings from the past and future conditions.
Condition Plausibility Similarity to 
previous
experiences
Similarity to 
previous thoughts
Consistency
across time 
points
Personal
significance
Temporal
distance
(years)
Past 2.98 (0.37) - - 3.47 (0.33) 2.04 (0.51) 2.56 (0.80)
Future 1.73 (0.40) 1.54 (0.36) 1.38 (0.34) 3.33 (0.34) 1.59 (0.47) 2.10 (0.56)
Note: Ratings (except temporal distance) made using a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (low) to 4 (high). Plausibility,
personal significance, and temporal distance of events were different between conditions (BF10 = 5.22x107; BF10 = 
144.58; BF10 = 3.02). Note that plausibility ratings for past events (i.e., how plausible the event would have seemed
a week before it occurred) were collected to equate task demands with the future condition.
Do novel future events take longer to construct while comprising less detail than
past events?
Our first prediction was that future events would take longer to construct but would 
nevertheless comprise less detail than past events when events are imagined/remembered for the
first time in the experimental setting. To this end, we used two Bayesian directional paired-
samples t-tests (Morey & Rouder, 2011) between response times and detail ratings of both future
and past conditions at time point 1. In line with our prediction, we found very strong evidence
for future events taking longer to construct (BF+0 = 2.81x105, see Figure 2B) and being less
detailed (BF+0 = 4.48x107, see Figure 2E) than past events. 
                      
 
 
           
            
              
         
             
              
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
11CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Figure 2. Future events take longer to construct (A-C) and comprise less detail (D-F) than past events, but this
difference decreases across time points. (A, D) Response times (RT)/detail ratings of past and future events at time 
points 1, 2, and 3 with 95% confidence intervals. (B, E) Initial (time point 1) response times/detail ratings of past
and future events. The plots show the distribution of scores (violin) together with the mean (box central dot), median 
(box central line), first and third quartile (box edges), minimum and maximum (whiskers), and outliers (outside
dots). (C, F) Difference in response times (future - past)/detail ratings (past - future) at each time point with 95%
confidence intervals.
These results extend previous findings (Anderson et al., 2012) by showing that it takes
participants substantially longer to create a new imagined event representation than to retrieve an 
existing representation of a past event. Given that future events were also less detailed than past
events, independently replicating previous research (e.g., Addis et al., 2010, 2009; Berntsen &
Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Gamboz et al., 2010; McDonough &
Gallo, 2010), increased response times do not reflect integration of more details, but additional
cognitive demands during simulation, such as the formation of novel associations between 
component details. 
Having confirmed that construction time and detail differences exist between past and 
future conditions at time point 1, in the next two sets of analyses, we analysed data from all time
points of the experiment to determine whether these effects reflect a fundamental difference
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
    
 
 
  
 
  
      
               
            
 
 
 
  
   
12CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
between episodic simulation and episodic memory, or whether these differences can be ascribed 
to the intrinsic novelty of future events, when constructed for the first time.
Do events become faster to construct and more detailed with repetition?
Our second prediction was that repetition effects would be evident for both past and 
future events, with a linear decrease in response times and a corresponding increase in detail
ratings across time points. We computed four Bayesian repeated-measures order-restricted 
ANOVAs, one for each of the two conditions (past, future) and each of the two dependent
variables (response times, detail ratings), with time point as the within-subject factor. Order 
restrictions (Haaf & Rouder, 2017; Morey & Wagenmakers, 2014; Rouder et al., 2018) allow
testing more specific hypotheses than the default alternative hypothesis that all means are
different, without the need for post hoc tests. The order-restricted models we used (M1) tested for 
a linear decrease/increase, i.e., the restriction time point 1 > time point 2 > time point 3 for 
response times and time point 1 < time point 2 < time point 3 for detail ratings. These models
were compared to the null model of no differences between time points (M0; time point 1 = time
point 2 = time point 3), as well as to the unconstrained model of differences in any direction 
between the time points (Mu; time point 1 ≠ time point 2 ≠ time point 3). All models are depicted 
in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Models tested in Experiment 1 for response times and detail ratings of future and past conditions across
the three time points. M0: null model, time point 1 = time point 2 = time point 3;Mu: unconstrained model, time
point 1 ≠ time point 2 ≠ time point 3; M1: order-restricted model, time point 1 > time point 2 > time point 3 for 
response times and time point 1 < time point 2 < time point 3 for detail ratings.
For future event response times, the order-restricted model (M1) was preferred over all
other models, showing very strong evidence not just for a difference between time points, but
specifically for a linear decrease in response times across time points (BF10 = 7.18x1016; BF1u = 
5.9; BFu0 = 1.21x1016; see Figure 2A). M1 was also the strongest model for past event response
                      
 
    
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
    
    
 
 
 
 
13CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
times (BF10 = 9.65x1016; BF1u = 5.5, BFu0 = 1.76x1016). The preference for M1 was mirrored in 
the detail rating analyses, which showed that detail increased linearly across time points for 
future (BF10 = 4.96x107; BF1u = 6; BFu0 = 8.27x106; see Figure 2D) and for past events (BF10 = 
2455.50; BF1u = 5.6; BFu0 = 434.72).
These results replicate previous findings indicating that response times for future event
representations decrease linearly across time points, while at the same time becoming more
detailed and elaborate (van Mulukom et al., 2013). We extended these findings by demonstrating 
that the same repetition effects are evident for past events. The remaining question now is
whether this decrease differs between future and past events, that is, whether the constructive
demands of future events decrease more markedly with repetition than those of past events, or 
whether demands change in the same way irrespective of condition.
Do future events become increasingly similar to past events across repetitions in
terms of construction times and incorporated detail?
The critical test of this experiment was the condition by time point interaction. If 
repetition effects are the same for past and future conditions, then the magnitude of the past-
future differences for response time and detail at the first time point will be maintained over time
points. However, if repetition effects are heightened in the future condition, then the past-future
differences evident at the first time point will dissipate with repeated retrieval/simulation as
future events become increasingly similar to past events in terms of response times and detail
ratings. To test these alternatives, we calculated difference scores between past and future
conditions, for both response times and detail ratings, at each time point. We entered each set of 
past-future difference scores into a Bayesian order-restricted repeated-measures ANOVA with 
time point as the within-subject factor (time point 1 > time point 2 > time point 3). We found 
very strong evidence that the difference between past and future event construction times
decreased across time points (BF10 = 2.73x109; BF1u = 5.9; BFu0 = 4.63x108; see Figure 2C). The
same was the case for detail ratings (BF10 = 2.59x104; BF1u = 5.9; BFu0 = 4384.31; see Figure
2F). These findings indicate that with repetition, future events increasingly resemble past events
with regard to how fast they are constructed and how much detail is incorporated. Moreover, the
results also reflect the fact that repetition effects for both response time and detail ratings were
heightened in the future condition. Importantly, this pattern of findings supports the hypothesis
that, relative to past events, simulating future events is particularly demanding when doing so 
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from scratch, rather than the hypothesis that future simulation is always more demanding than 
retrieval. 
It is important to note that the simulation of future events is unlikely to remain process-
pure across repetitions, as re-imagining future events at time points 2 and 3 will involve
remembering the event as it was originally imagined at time point 1. With respect to interpreting 
the above interaction effect, retrieving the original simulation necessarily increases the similarity 
of the future condition with the past condition at time points 2 and 3. If the interaction is driven  
largely by the retrieval of the original simulation at time points 2 and 3 rather than a heightened 
repetition effect for future events per se, the repetition effect between time points 2 and 3 should 
be very similar for past and future events (i.e., no interaction effect). This however, was not the
case, as shown by a Bayesian directional (time point 2 > time point 3) paired t-test on the past-
future difference scores. Both construction times (BF+0 = 153.64) and detail ratings (BF+0 = 
89.01) still showed a heightened repetition effect in the future compared to the past condition. 
Thus, while this limitation is unavoidable with this particular design, it is unlikely to solely 
account for the convergence of past and future events over time.
Note that although there was a slight difference in familiarity ratings of the detail sets
between conditions (with future events containing more familiar components than past events), 
this difference is unlikely to have influenced the results as increased familiarity should have
yielded effects in the opposite direction to our observed results (i.e., future events should have
been associated with faster response times and more detail than past events). 
Can the results be explained by other phenomenological ratings?
Future events were rated as less personally significant than past events and it is thus
possible that additional effort was required to align these imagined events with personal
autobiographical knowledge and expectations (D’Argembeau, 2016; Klein, 2016), or to resolve
potential implausibilities. In order to examine whether there was evidence for any of these
hypotheses, we conducted a series of additional analyses using the personal significance and 
plausibility ratings. Note that these are unplanned, exploratory analyses, providing a more fine-
grained description of the data.
Personal significance of events
In order to ensure that the observed past-future differences could not be explained by a
difference in personal significance between conditions, we ran Bayesian repeated-measures
                      
 
   
       
  
 
     
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
    
  
 
  
 
15CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
order-restricted ANCOVAs, testing for differences in response times (future > past) and detail
ratings (past > future) between future and past conditions at time point 1, with personal
significance ratings added as a covariate. For both models, there was still very strong evidence
for these differences after accounting for personal significance ratings (response times: BF10 = 
2.61x105 vs. BF10 = 3.81x105 for the model without the covariate; detail ratings: BF10 = 3.89x106 
vs. BF10 = 4.10x107), providing evidence against the hypothesis that the observed differences are
due to past and future events differing in how personally significant they are judged to be.
Plausibility of events
Given that the interpretation of plausibility ratings is not equivalent across past and future
conditions, we were unable to examine whether plausibility plays a role in past-future
differences. We did, however, examine whether plausibility ratings predicted response times and 
detail ratings of future events on a trial-by-trial basis, using Bayesian hierarchical linear models
(with random intercepts and slopes for each participant) created with the brms (Bürkner, 2017)
and coda (Plummer et al., 2006) R packages. We conducted two analyses, testing whether 
plausibility ratings predict the outcome variables during initial construction (time point 1), and 
whether they predict the respective change between time points 1 and 3 (see Fig. 4; plots of 
subject-specific estimates can be found at osf.io/xqm5n/). There was strong evidence that, at time
point 1, less plausible future events took longer to construct (b = -146.87, 90% CI [-246.61, -
45.85], BF-0 = 94.24) and were less detailed (b = 0.25, 90% CI [0.17, 0.33], BF+0 > 5×103) than 
more plausible events. Less plausible future events also benefited more from repetition (response
times: b = -160.71, 90% CI [-269.27, -49.15], BF-0 = 99.63; detail ratings: b = -0.13, 90% CI [-
0.22, -0.05], BF-0 = 131.23). While our main analyses showed that the generation of novel future
events imposes additional constructive demands on the simulation system as compared to 
remembering past events, this exploratory analysis suggests that this is especially true for future
events that are less plausible with respect to one’s life. As others have argued, this is likely 
because less plausible future events require the generation of more novel associations between 
disparate details (cf. Weiler et al., 2010a).
                      
 
 
  
            
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
16CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Figure 4. The relationship between future event plausibility and (A) initial construction times and incorporated 
detail, as well as (B) construction time and detail changes between time points 1 and 3. The plots show fitted models
estimated via Bayesian hierarchical linear modelling, with 95% credible intervals.
Overall, the findings from Experiment 1 demonstrate that, relative to past events, the
constructive demands associated with future events are particularly heightened when these
events are imagined for the first time, that is, when unique sets of details are integrated into novel
representations, and even more so for implausible future events. It is likely that these amplified 
demands are driving many of the effects reported in the literature, as participants typically 
imagine future events from scratch. Although the repetition effects reported here indicate that
both past and future events are constructed more quickly across time points even as the event
representations become more detailed, the changes across time points are more pronounced for 
future events as the demands of the initial construction dissipate and past and future events
become more similar. One question that follows from these findings relates to the contribution of 
different event components to this process—are all episodic details equally important, or do 
different details play different roles?
                      
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Experiment 2
Our second aim was to examine in more detail the constructive processes involved in 
future event simulation, by establishing the constructive demands associated with the generation 
of different components of these events. Specifically, we set out to clarify whether the generation 
of a spatial context contributes disproportionately to the construction of these events relative to 
other details, by manipulating directly the integration of different detail types (locations and 
people) into the events. Similar to Experiment 1, participants imagined future events across two 
time points, and we recorded response times as a proxy for construction times, as well as
participants’ ratings for detail, difficulty, and how similar the events were perceived to be across
time points. Importantly, at time point 2, participants reimagined the events either exactly as at
time point 1 (no change condition), or with a critical detail changed: either with a different
person (person change condition), or in a different location (location change condition). 
Given that the no change condition was identical to time points 1 and 2 in Experiment 1, 
we expected to replicate those repetition findings, namely that relative to time point 1, future
events at time point 2 would be faster to construct, but nonetheless be more detailed. We
expected future event construction furthermore to become less difficult upon repetition, 
replicating previous research (Szpunar, St Jacques, et al., 2014). Importantly, this condition 
provided us with a baseline magnitude of the effect of repetition when the event representation 
did not change. Additionally, we predicted that repetition effects would also be evident in the
two change conditions, as participants were instructed to keep the event content constant across
repetitions, apart from the one detail (person/location) that was explicitly changed. However, if a
particular component detail contributes disproportionately to the construction of future event
representations, then a change in that detail should reduce the magnitude of the repetition effect
(i.e., the repetition-related benefit to response time and difficulty and detail ratings). Therefore,
we expected that, relative to the no change condition (i.e., the baseline repetition effect), a
change in key episodic details, such as person or location, should be sufficient to disrupt
construction and thus reduce repetition effects. Critically, we also compared directly repetition 
effects in the person and location change conditions to adjudicate between two competing 
hypotheses: if both types of episodic details are important to event construction, in line with the
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Roberts, Schacter, et al., 2017; Schacter & Addis, 
2007), then the magnitude of the repetition effect for the two change conditions should be
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
                    
 
18CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
reduced to a similar degree relative to the no change condition; however, if spatial components
are more critical to event construction than non-spatial components, as predicted by the scene
construction and spatial scaffolding hypotheses (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Robin, 2018), then 
the location change condition should be associated with a greater reduction in repetition effects
than the person change condition.
Methods
Participants
Forty-four healthy young adults participated in this study and provided informed consent
in a manner approved by The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee. 
There was no overlap of our samples between experiments. One participant was excluded 
because of technical problems with E-prime and one participant did not complete the experiment. 
Thus, data from 42 participants (nine males, aged 18–34 years, M = 24 years, SD = 4.4 years) 
were analysed. 
Procedure
We adapted the paradigm from Experiment 1 in a number of ways: (1) In the stimulus
collection session, we instructed participants to list 100 people and 100 locations from their 
autobiographical memory, rather than retrieving 100 episodic autobiographical memories (a
modification to the episodic recombination paradigm used in other studies; e.g., Szpunar et al., 
2012; van Mulukom et al., 2016); (2) instead of using objects as the third detail in the detail sets, 
we randomly assigned a highly familiar action verb (in addition to the pseudo-random
assignment of a pair of participant-generated person and location details, where detail familiarity 
and frequency of encounter ratings [on a 4-point scale from once a year to every day] were
matched across conditions)2; (3) we only included two time points for each trial instead of three, 
as the largest change in response time and ratings data in Experiment 1 occurred between time
points 1 and 2; (4) we only included the future condition, which was now subdivided into three
conditions (no change—same detail set for time points 1 and 2, as in Experiment 1; person 
change—the person detail changed between time points 1 and 2, while the other two details
[location, verb] remained the same; location change—the location detail changed between time
points 1 and 2, while the other two details [person, verb] remained the same); (5) ratings
2 The decision to use action verbs instead of objects was in response to feedback from participants in similar studies
that, while they include the object detail in their simulations as instructed, the objects are rarely integral to the event. 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
       
    
      
            
            
             
           
19CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
following every future simulation were self-paced (rather than 4 s as in Experiment 1) and we
collected difficulty ratings in addition to detail ratings (on a 4-point scale from low to high); (6) 
similarity ratings (operationalised in the same way as ‘consistency’ in Experiment 1) for each set
of corresponding events were collected at time point 2 during the experiment, rather than after 
the completion of all trials; and (7) ratings of event plausibility were now collected after 
completion of all trials in the experiment. 
For each participant, people and locations from their lists were randomly combined with 
a list of 72 verbs to create 72 detail sets (24 in each of the 3 conditions). For detail sets in the two 
change conditions, a modified detail set to be shown during time point 2 was created by 
substituting the critical detail (person or location) with another of the 28 people or locations
remaining on each list. Replacement details were selected pseudo-randomly to match detail, 
familiarity, and frequency of encounter ratings as closely as possible across conditions. 
Additionally, the person and location details were either presented in the top or middle position 
of the screen in a counterbalanced fashion (while the verb was always presented last), thus half 
of the changed details were in the upper position and half were in the middle position. 
Familiarity and frequency of encounter ratings for person and location details for each 
condition are presented in Table 3. Frequency of encounter ratings for locations differed between 
conditions (person change > location change mean, BF10 = 12.11; person change > no change, 
BF10 = 75.07). The other ratings did not differ between conditions (all BFs10 < 0.3), and there
was also no evidence for a difference in the change in ratings across time points (i.e., between 
original and changed detail sets) between conditions (person familiarity: BF10 = 1.16; person 
frequency of encounter: BF10 = 0.97; location familiarity: BF10 = 0.02; location frequency of 
encounter: BF10 = 0.56), or for differences between the change in person familiarity/frequency of 
encounter and location familiarity/frequency of encounter across time points, all BFs10 < 0.3.
Table 3
Means (standard deviations) of familiarity and frequency of encounter ratings for original and changed details 
across all experimental conditions.
Familiarity Frequency of encounter
Person detail Location detail Person detail Location detail
Condition Original Changed Original Changed Original Changed Original Changed
No change 2.51 (0.45) - 2.73 (0.51) - 1.98 (0.37) - 1.95 (0.38) -
Person change 2.57 (0.45) 2.48 (0.43) 2.79 (0.52) - 2.03 (0.42) 1.93 2.09 (0.43) -
                      
 
 
      
 
     
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
     
           
        
 
20CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
(0.40)
Location change 2.47 (0.35) - 2.79 (0.53) 2.75 2.00 (0.40) - 2.04 (0.38) 1.96 
(0.52) (0.39)
Note: Ratings were made on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (low) to 4 (high).
In session 2 (about one to two weeks after session 1; M = 9.9 days, SD = 8.1 days), each 
of the 72 detail sets were presented twice, resulting in 144 time points (i.e., simulation + ratings;
48 per condition; see Fig. 5 for an example of two time points from one trial). The total
experiment was broken into four blocks of 36 time points, after each of which participants were
offered a short break. Four different pseudo-randomised sequences across the 4 blocks were
constructed to ensure that repetitions were always in the same block, that the distances between 
repetitions were distributed evenly across conditions (2–5 time points or 20–50 seconds, plus
self-paced ratings), and that there were no more than three consecutive trials of the same
condition. Participants were assigned to a version in a counterbalanced manner.
Figure 5. Corresponding time points 1 and 2 from an example future simulation trial in Experiment 2. At time point 
1, participants imagined a future event involving the details presented on the screen, and at time point 2, they either
reimagined the same event in an identical manner (no change; orange), or reimagined the event with a different 
person (person change; dark teal), or in a different location (location change; light teal). After simulating each 
event, participants rated how detailed the event was and how difficult it was to construct, and (following time point
2) how similar or consistent the simulations were across the two corresponding time points.
                      
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
             
     
           
           
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
     
 
21CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Analyses
As in Experiment 1, for each participant we calculated median response time and mean 
detail, difficulty, and similarity ratings. Instead of raw scores, we used difference scores to 
quantify repetition effects (time point 1 - time point 2 for response times; time point 2 - time 
point 1 for ratings) for all outcome measures because our main interest lay in whether repetition 
effects differed across conditions. Both time points for a given detail set were excluded from
analysis if response times were too fast for the participant to read the instructions on the screen 
(< 500ms), or if the participant indicated that they could not come up with an event (see Results
section for the proportion of trials excluded for each condition).
Unless otherwise specified, priors for Bayesian analyses were identical to the ones used 
in Experiment 1, and all analyses were performed in R (RRID:SCR_001905; R Core Team, 
2019), using the following packages: dplyr (Wickham et al., 2018), BayesFactor (Morey &
Rouder, 2018), psych (Revelle, 2018), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009), cowplot (Wilke, 2017), Rmisc
(Hope, 2013), BEST (Kruschke & Meredith, 2018), CODA (Plummer et al., 2006), and rjags
(Plummer, 2016). 
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for future events across the three conditions are presented in Table
4. Response times, difficulty ratings, detail ratings, and similarity ratings for each event type at
each time point are also presented in Figure 6. The analysed data included 89.2% of all trial sets
(no change: M = 89.98%, SD = 12.49; person change: M = 88.89%, SD = 13.55; location change:
88.79%, SD = 13.82). 
Table 4
Means (standard deviations) of response times, and difficulty, detail, and similarity ratings across the three 
experimental conditions at time points 1 and 2.
Response time (ms) Difficulty Detail Similarity of events
Condition 1 2 1 2 1 2 across time points
No change 4780.46 2954.40 1.91 1.61 2.93 2.93 3.65 
(1496.34) (1507.11) (0.45) (0.51) (0.46) (0.46) (0.36)
Person change 4849.92 4093.76 1.91 1.93 2.92 2.85 2.89 
(1576.26) (1607.43) (0.49) (0.54) (0.52) (0.59) (0.54)
Location change 4830.60 4285.90 1.90 1.86 2.94 2.92 2.65 
(1446.18) (1458.12) (0.50) (0.47) (0.55) (0.54) (0.55)
Note: Ratings made using a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (low) to 4 (high).
                      
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
      
      
 
     
    
    
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
22CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
By design, there should be no systematic differences between conditions at time point 1, 
as the experimental manipulation was only applied at time point 2. To confirm this was the case, 
we tested for differences in response times, difficulty ratings, and detail ratings between 
conditions at time point 1 with Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVAs before the main analyses, 
which showed strong evidence for no differences between conditions (construction times: BF01 = 
9.95; detail ratings: BF01 = 11.50; difficulty ratings: BF01 = 12.66). We also checked whether the
plausibility of events differed between conditions and found strong evidence for no differences, 
BF01 = 22.61.
Are repetition effects evident despite changes in event components?
Our first prediction was that response times and difficulty ratings would decrease, and 
detail ratings would increase, across time points in all three conditions. Using a series of nine
Bayesian directional one-sample t-tests (one for each dependent variable in each condition), we
compared difference scores quantifying the effect of repetition (i.e., time point 2 - time points 1) 
against zero. In all three conditions, we found very strong evidence for a decrease in response
time (no change:M = 1736.42, BF+0 = 8.82x109; person change:M = 714.17, BF+0 = 7.65x105; 
location change:M = 484.82, BF+0 = 1.44x104). Moreover, in the no change condition there was
also strong evidence for a decrease in difficulty ratings and an increase in the amount of detail
incorporated into events across time points (difficulty:M = -0.30, BF-0 = 1.15×105; detail:M = 
0.20, BF+0 = 604.81). In contrast, for both person change and location change conditions, there
was stronger evidence for the null hypothesis indicating that there was no difference in difficulty 
and detail ratings across time points (person change:  difficulty, M = 0.03; BF-0 = 0.11; detail, M
= -0.07, BF+0 = 0.07; location change: difficulty, M = -0.03, BF-0 = 0.41; detail, M = -0.03, BF+0 
= 0.11).
The response time findings replicate and extend the results from Experiment 1, 
demonstrating that repetition facilitates faster construction of imagined future events, even when 
there are specific alterations in content. Despite faster response times overall, changes in person 
and location details disrupted the effects of repetition on the subjective difficulty of event
construction and the amount of detail imagined. While reimagining future events in exactly the
same way was perceived as less difficult and resulted in the generation of more detailed 
representations, the alteration of one detail—irrespective of detail type—eliminated these
repetition effects.
                      
 
 
 
     
         
           
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
Figure 6. Response times and difficulty, detail, and similarity ratings of episodic simulations. (A) Raw response 
times, difficulty ratings, and detail ratings at time points 1 and 2 for each condition, with 95% confidence intervals. 
(B) Difference scores for response times, difficulty ratings, and detail ratings; and raw scores for similarity ratings 
(only collected at time point 2). The plots show the distribution of scores (violin) for each condition, together with
the mean (box central dot), median (box central line), first and third quartile (box edges), minimum and maximum
(whiskers), and outliers (outside dots).
Do changes to spatial context differentially reduce repetition effects?
Beyond examining whether repetition effects are generally evident even when one key 
component has changed, the main goal of this experiment was to compare directly the impact of 
changes in spatial and non-spatial details to determine whether these detail types have a
differential influence on future event construction. We predicted that reimagining events without
any changes would lead to a greater repetition effect than in the two change conditions. 
Critically, if spatial components are more central to the construction of future events, we
predicted that a location change should result in a greater reduction of repetition effects than a
person change. In contrast, if both types of episodic details are important to event construction, 
then location and person changes should reduce repetition effects to a similar degree. To test
these predictions, we entered each dependent variable (difference scores for response times, 
difficulty ratings, and detail ratings, as well as time point 2 ratings for event similarity) into four 
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separate Bayesian one-way order-restricted repeated-measures ANOVAs, where each ANOVA
compared four models with different order and equality constraints (see Figure 7, top). We
constructed these models in a way such that the no change condition—as the baseline
condition—always had the greatest repetition effects, while being able to simultaneously test
whether a location change was associated with greater (M2; no change > person change > 
location change), or the same (M1; no change > [person change = location change]) degree of 
repetition-related reduction as a person change. We compared these models against both an 
unconstrained model (Mu; no change ≠ person change ≠ location change), which holds that there
are differences between conditions without specifying the directions, and the null model (M0; no 
change = person change = location change) that there is no difference between conditions. The
critical comparison was thus between M1 and M2.
Figure 7. Upper panel: Repetition effects models tested in Experiment 2 (top). M0: null model, no change = person 
change = location change; Mu: unconstrained model, no change ≠ person change ≠ location change; M1: order and
equality restricted model, no change > (person change = location change); M2: order-restricted model, no change > 
person change > location change. Lower panel: Results for response times, difficulty ratings, detail ratings, and 
                      
 
          
    
 
  
   
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
       
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
    
 
 
25CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
similarity ratings. Diagrams show the models from strongest (top) to weakest (bottom) and the Bayes factors 
between each pair of models.
For response time data, M2 was the preferred model, 1.2 times stronger than M1, 5.7 times
stronger than the unconstrained model (Mu), and 1012 times stronger than the null model (M0; see
Figure 7 for BFs between all models for each dependent variable). Although M2 models the
location change condition as having smaller repetition effects than the person change condition, 
in line with the hypothesis that spatial context plays a more important role in the construction of 
future events than non-spatial details, it is important to note that the evidence for supporting M2 
over M1 was very weak; at only 1.2, the BF indicates that M2 is only slightly more probable than 
M1 (i.e., if BF = 1, M2 and M1 would be considered equally probable). We elaborate further on 
this point in the section below.
With respect to both difficulty and detail ratings, M1 was the strongest model (difficulty:
BF1u = 6, BF12 = 9.4, BF10 = 107; detail: BF12 = 5.9, BF1u = 8, BF10 = 105). These results suggest
that, while repetition effects for the difficulty and detail ratings were smaller during both change
conditions relative to the no change condition, there was no difference between person and 
location changes in the magnitude of decrease from time point 1 to time point 2. Finally, M2 was 
the preferred model for the event similarity ratings collected at time point 2 (BF2u = 6, BF21 = 
59.7, BF20 = 1022). This finding indicates that, while the future events constructed at time points
1 and 2 in the no change condition were rated as more similar than when a key detail changed 
between time points, altering the location in particular made the events subjectively less similar 
than altering the person.
Follow-up analyses for response time repetition effects in the two change conditions
As aforementioned, the BF of our critical comparison of M2 over M1 for response time
was very weak. It is possible, however, that the large difference between the no change condition 
and the two change conditions (which was included in both models) inflated the similarity of 
models M1 and M2 at the expense of smaller differences. In other words, the no change > change
condition effect may have obscured a potentially larger difference between person change and 
location change conditions. To explore this possibility, we focused exclusively on the two 
change conditions, and used a Bayesian directional paired t-test to test whether repetition effects
are smaller following a change in location versus a change in person. We complemented this
analysis with Bayesian parameter estimation, which, rather than contrasting models, allows for 
                      
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
  	 	   	 	  
 
 
  
  
   
 
    
  
 
          
       
        
            
  
26CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
estimation of the magnitude of parameters of interest, as well as their uncertainty, both of which 
are derived from the posterior probability distribution. Importantly, it also assesses the range of 
the most credible parameter values, and whether this range includes the null (i.e., zero). Put
another way, it assesses whether or not parameter values around zero are amongst the most
credible values of the parameter. We followed the procedure outlined by Kruschke (2013, 2018)
by constructing a 95% highest density interval (HDI)3, that is, the interval of the posterior 
probability distribution that includes 95% of the most credible values. We calculated the
difference of repetition effects between conditions (person change repetition effects - location 
change repetition effects) to determine whether the difference between conditions is non-zero, 
and used a t distribution4 as descriptive model of these data—thus estimating mean µ, standard 
deviation σ, and normality parameter ν—with hyperparameters defined as follows: � ∼ �(�, �+103); � ∼ �( 12 ) + 1 , with � ≥ 1.Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 103 , �+103); � ∼ �( 1 29
with three chains, each with 106 iterations (no thinning) and a burn-in of 103, was used to 
generate posterior samples. MCMC chains were checked for convergence and to ensure that they 
were of sufficient length (for all parameters, �:= 1 and ESS > 10,000).
The Bayesian directional paired t-test showed evidence for a difference between the two 
conditions (BF+0 = 3.84). Even though this Bayes factor does not constitute strong evidence, this
result was further supported by our Bayesian parameter estimation. The marginal posterior 
distributions on the three estimated parameters (µ, σ, and ν), the posterior distribution on the
effect size (µ/σ), and a posterior predictive check are shown in Figure 8. The posterior 
distribution for µ had a mean of 233.48 (SD = 97.91), indicating that when spatial context
changed, response time repetition effects were reduced by about 233 ms relative to person 
changes. Importantly, all of the credible values of µ were non-zero (95% HDI: [38.98, 425.36]). 
The posterior distribution on the effect size also indicated a non-zero difference between 
conditions (M = 0.40, SD = 0.18; 95% HDI: [0.05, 0.74]). The posterior predictive check (Figure
8B), which was created by plotting the t distribution of randomly selected steps in the MCMC 
3 Although the HDI is similar to a frequentist confidence interval in that it reflects the uncertainty of the estimated 
parameter value, there are important differences in that an HDI also provides information regarding the probability 
of the parameter value, given the data (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018). 
4 Note that the use of a t distribution allows more flexibility than a Gaussian distribution, especially as it can better
accommodate extreme data points.
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chains together with a histogram of our data, suggested that the t distribution was a good 
description of our data.
Figure 8. Parameter estimation of the difference in response time repetition effects (person change - location
change) against zero. Results further support the model comparison analysis result that repetition effects are smaller 
in the location change condition than in the person change condition. (A) Posterior distributions on the mean (µ),
standard deviation (σ), effect size (µ/σ), and the normality parameter (log10v). On each distribution, the 95% HDI is 
marked (black line). Grey dashed line indicates a difference/effect size of zero. (B) Posterior predictive check,
consisting of a histogram of the data and a random selection of 30 credible t distributions from the MCMC samples.
Taken together, these results suggest that spatial context contributed to the time it takes to 
construct future events more than person details, in line with theories highlighting the central
contribution of space in episodic simulation (e.g., scene construction theory: Hassabis &
Maguire, 2007; spatial scaffold effect: Robin, 2018). Moreover, events that differed only with 
respect to spatial context were perceived as less similar than events that differed only in person, 
further supporting the notion that spatial context constitutes a defining feature of the event. 
Importantly, these effects cannot be ascribed to a difference in familiarity or plausibility ratings
of people and locations between the two conditions (see Table 3). Although there was a
difference between conditions in location frequency of encounter ratings, this difference is
unlikely to have influenced the reported effects given that it was very small (0.08 on a 4-point
scale) and that the change in this rating between time points did not differ between conditions. It
could also be argued that some activities, as determined by the verbs that were part of the detail
sets, were more easily imaginable in some locations than in others. If true, this would mean that
location changes were more disruptive than person changes, simply because of incongruencies
between certain types of actions and specific locations. In order to circumvent this potential
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confound, our design only included verbs describing activities that are plausible regardless of 
spatial context (e.g., jumping, singing, laughing).
The pattern of results described above did not hold for incorporated detail and perceived 
construction difficulty. The fact that incorporated detail did not differ between the two change
conditions is perhaps not surprising, given that in both of these conditions only one key detail
was changed and replaced with another detail that should be similarly detailed. However, the
results for perceived difficulty went against our prediction; we expected them to be in line with 
the construction time findings. This could potentially be an artefact of our design; the activity 
that was part of the event did not have to be, but typically was (according to descriptions by our 
participants) carried out by the provided person in the event. Thus, it is possible that when the
person was changed, participants found it more difficult to imagine a different person doing the
same action, inflating the difficulty ratings for that condition.
General Discussion
In this series of experiments, we examined the construction process of past and future
events. First, we tested whether it is always more demanding to imagine future events than to 
recall past events, or whether the increased demands with future simulation are particularly 
heightened when imagining events from scratch. The results of our first experiment suggest the
latter to be the case; when initially imagined, future events took substantially longer to construct
despite being less detailed than past events, but with repetition, future events and past events
became increasingly similar. We also investigated whether these amplified demands are driven 
by specific event components. The second experiment provided evidence for this hypothesis, 
such that the construction of a spatial context influenced construction times and perceived 
similarity of events more than person details. Subjective difficulty to construct the event and 
incorporated detail, however, were not influenced by event component type. These results, being 
the first to investigate specifically the construction process of past and future events and their 
components, offer new insights with implications for current theoretical frameworks of episodic
memory and episodic simulation.
Our results dovetail with previously reported differences between episodic memory and 
episodic simulation (e.g., past events being more detailed, more specific, and easier and faster to 
generate than future events). However, our findings also suggest that the interpretation of these
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results as past-future differences might be misguided; instead of reflecting temporal orientation, 
they might be attributable to the nature of the experimental paradigms and tasks typically used in 
these studies. In our experiment, once future events had been created and reimagined repeatedly, 
differences in construction time and generated detail between past and future events dissipated. 
This effect had not been evident before this study, because experiments have not considered how
the construction of past and future events changes across repeated simulations.
This finding corroborates theoretical and empirical work highlighting the high degree of 
similarity between episodic memory and episodic simulation (e.g., Addis, 2018; Buckner &
Carroll, 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Ingvar, 1985; McDermott & Gilmore, 
2015; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 
1985), consistent with the view that episodic memory and episodic simulation are instantiations
of one simulation system or a general faculty of mental time travel, as well as with philosophical
positions of continuism, which argue that—apart from temporal orientation—there is no 
fundamental difference between episodic memory and episodic simulation (see e.g., Perrin &
Michaelian, 2017). In line with this, Addis (2018) suggests a reconceptualisation of past-future
differences as differences in ‘associative history’ (i.e., how often the details comprising the event
have been temporally co-activated). According to this account, the fluency of the event
increases—and constructive demands decrease—the more often an event representation is
retrieved and the stronger associations between event components become (up to a certain point, 
after which these changes level out). Our results provide direct evidence for this account, with 
event construction being slow and demanding when event components have not been associated 
before (i.e., future events at time point 1), events being brought to mind with increasing ease as
the associative strength of the event representation increases (i.e., past and future events across
time points 1 to 3), and the magnitude of this repetition effect decreasing across time points (i.e., 
difference between past and future events across time points 1 to 3). A similar effect has been 
reported for novel counterfactual simulations (simulations of alternative ways past events could 
have occurred, i.e., past events that are created from scratch), which, when imagined repeatedly, 
became more detailed and easier to generate (De Brigard et al., 2013), further supporting the
view that these effects reflect associative strength of event representations, rather than temporal
orientation. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, a likely underlying 
mechanism for constructive demands that change as a function of associative history is the
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
30CONSTRUCTIVE DEMANDS OF EPISODIC SIMULATIONS
degree of relational processing required to integrate all components into the event representation, 
which is high for novel combinations, and decreases as associations become stronger. 
Interestingly, in other studies we have found that when the components comprising novel future
events are disparate, construction times and perceived difficulty are higher still—and 
incorporated detail lower—compared to novel future events including related components
(Roberts, Wiebels, et al., 2017; van Mulukom et al., 2016). Our exploratory analyses in Study 1, 
showing that constructive demands are modulated by plausibility, such that less plausible events
are less detailed but take longer to imagine, provide further evidence for this idea. 
An account focused on relational processing could also explain the findings of our second 
experiment, which demonstrated that the heightened constructive demands when future events
are imagined from scratch—especially the time it takes to construct the events—are driven in 
large part by spatial context. These results are broadly consistent with theories highlighting the
central role of spatial processing in episodic simulation (e.g., scene construction theory: Hassabis
& Maguire, 2007; spatial scaffold effect: Robin, 2018) and could reflect a fundamental
difference between the role different event components play during the construction process. 
Indeed, spatial context has been argued to provide the ‘stage’ upon which the event plays out
(Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; see also Rubin et al., 2018), and is thus critical to any event
representation. However, an alternative explanation is that the difference lies more generally in 
the degree of relational processing required to construct different event components. If each 
event component comprising an event is, in and of itself, an assemblage of relevant semantic, 
episodic, and other sensory elements, then more elaborate representations would have a greater 
influence on event construction times (for a discussion of this point see Roberts, Schacter, et al., 
2017). Findings from studies using the scene construction task indicate that scene representations
do contain more than spatial elements, including episodic content such as entities, sensory 
descriptions, thoughts, emotions, and actions (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Madore et al., 2019). 
Thus, it is possible that spatial contexts are more elaborate than other event components (e.g., 
people, objects), and result in more intensive relational processing at the level of event
components, instead of events per se. This hypothesis is consistent with our results, though it
remains to be tested directly, for example via the manipulation of the number of elements that
make up event components (such as people and spatial context). 
A related point concerns the categorical distinction between spatial and non-spatial event
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components, instantiated in the present study via the contrast between spatial contexts and person 
details. This distinction is non-trivial; it could be argued that person details are also spatial, in the
sense that they have a position in space, and that they themselves are made of spatial elements— 
in contrast to event components such as actions or emotions (for a broader discussion see also 
Ekstrom & Ranganath, 2017). Another outstanding question, and a potential avenue for future
research, is thus whether our results extend to event components that truly lack any spatial
elements.
In conclusion, we have shown that constructive demands are heightened when events are
imagined from scratch—as is the case with novel future events—and that construction times and 
incorporated detail of future events become increasingly similar to past events when repeatedly 
constructed. These findings suggest that constructive demands may reflect differences in 
associative strength, rather than fundamental differences between episodic memory and episodic
simulation. Furthermore, we have shown that aspects of the constructive process, particularly 
construction times, are influenced disproportionately by spatial context compared to person 
details. While this could be due to spatial context playing a more central role in event
construction, it could also be that spatial contexts are simply more elaborate in nature, consisting 
of more elements that have to be bound together by relational processing. If confirmed by future
research, this interpretation could bridge theoretical accounts focused on explaining different
aspects of event construction. A promising way forward might be to reframe theoretical accounts
that are based on categorical distinctions into more continuous frameworks (see also Dalton et
al., 2017; Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2014; Roberts, Schacter, et al., 2017).
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